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The “Ethical” Dimension of Heidegger’s Philosophy: Consideration of Ethics in Its Original Source

“Heidegger and Ethics” remains a controversial topic among Heidegger scholars. What appears particularly troublesome is the conjunction itself, [which hints on a link between] Heidegger and ethics. Heidegger proposes to consider ethics in its original source, distinguishing it from morality and from “ethics” as a “philosophical discipline,” which often concerns with social or political issues. Heidegger distinguishes it from “ethics,” preferring to discuss “ethos” instead of “ethics.” Heidegger’s main “hero” here is Aristotle. When referring to Aristotelian texts, Heidegger attempts nothing less but to rethink the “first” part of first philosophy. The leading question in interpretation of Aristotle is the question of the objectness of Being, in which both Being of human and Being of life are interpreted. Heidegger asks himself what the phenomenological foundation for explicating the [meaning] of man is, and what categories evolve from this foundation. This article focuses on the same question.

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It begins with the discussion of hermeneutic phenomenology and concludes with the analysis of thinking rooted in historical Being - the two projects that signify important milestones in Heidegger's development.

“Heidegger and Ethics” remains a controversial topic among those who study Heidegger, particularly there is the doubt over conjoining Heidegger and ethics. We end up talking about Heidegger without addressing issues of ethics and, conversely, discussing ethics while often disregarding the figure of Heidegger. There are many studies that in one way or another revolve around the relationship between the ethical statement of the issue and Heidegger’s philosophy, which shows that this issue can be interpreted in a variety of ways, but also that the topic itself has not been fully resolved in Heidegger studies.

Let us examine this conjunction, Heidegger and ethics, without “Heideggerizing” the ethical statement of the issue or “ethicizing” Heidegger’s philosophy. In order to avoid these extremes, we should follow Heidegger’s own path as a thinker in such a way that we try to understand where the possibility of an ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thinking may be located, a possibility considered in different ways by various researchers. In that regard we could formulate two questions: (1) Why is there not yet clarity or unanimity in Heidegger studies with respect to the ethical dimension in *Being and Time*? (2) Can we talk about various ethical phenomena in Heidegger’s philosophy that would correspond to different periods in the philosopher’s work, or does his concept of the ethical represent some unified—and singular—phenomenon that occurs again and again in Heidegger’s path as a thinker, perhaps in different guises, but also in spite of differentiations?

Our task is not to justify the possibility of a “Heideggerian ethics.” Rather, we should show that the question of ethics in Heidegger’s philosophy is a fully valid one and demonstrate the existence of ethical problematics in his thinking at various stages. However, the first difficulty we face in this task is that Heidegger himself somewhat rarely and specifically discussed ethics, and then for the most part negatively. The second difficulty, which should be evident here, is that Heidegger did not leave us any systematic work devoted to ethics, in light of which the significant number of interpretations of Heidegger that offer an understanding of the ethical dimension of his thought seems somewhat discouraging, such that we should either catch these researchers themselves in an “ethical illusion” (which itself could also be the object of study) or try to follow them in disclosing the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s philosophy. It is surely no accident that many of Heidegger’s

own students and others who came under his influence (such as Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, and Joachim Ritter) were intensively engaged in these issues of ethics despite the fact that the person who inspired them did not express interest in these questions.

Undoubtedly, there are reasons to doubt that Heidegger's philosophy could serve as an impetus for ethics research, and we should mention two of them: (1) Heidegger's central work, *Being and Time*, was originally conceived as a project whose core element was not the person as such, but the meaning of Being in whose connection the human regards himself as *Dasein*, an entity in an exclusive relationship to Being. A person as *Dasein* is a being-understanding entity (*ein seinsverstehendes Seiendes*), the sole entity in whose Being refers to his own Being, whose distinguishing feature is his understanding of Being. Analysis of *Dasein* and work on its fundamental structure begin from this basis in order that the question of being, a goal for all this work, can be properly posed. Accordingly, clarifying *Dasein* as an entity in itself is considered merely as a means or a tool necessary for clarifying the main question. (2) Proceeding from this, it is fully valid to criticize the possibility of an ethical dimension to Heidegger's philosophy: no ethical approach is compatible with the emphatic "neutrality" of *Dasein*, which led Levinas to note ironically, "Heidegger's *Dasein* never experienced hunger,"¹ and which Derrida so desperately criticized.² At first glance this criticism seems valid, but we should note that the neutrality of *Dasein* "annuls" the moral, so to speak, but not the ethical as such.

Another problem we inevitably face when posing the question of the ethical in Heidegger's philosophy is the unity of Heidegger's thinking. In order to be able to assume the existence of some singular, unified phenomenon of the ethical in Heidegger's philosophy, we would have to proceed from some wholeness in his philosophy and thought. However, it is not so easy to follow this development. We can trace rather stark differences between the young Heidegger's philosophical project, the phenomenological hermeneutics of factuality, and his project of fundamental ontology that found expression in *Being and Time*, the period of his so-called "turn," and, finally, Heidegger's late work. However, similar differences "within" a single philosophical way of thinking always err in gross simplifications that take little for us to clarify. Therefore, for clarity's sake we will make a distinction between "early" and "late" Heidegger here. Heidegger himself repeatedly stressed that, when referring to his thought, we should talk about the path itself, not "completed" works and stages.³

In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger laments, “Soon after the release of *Being and Time* a certain young friend asked me, ‘When will you write about ethics?’ . . . [if] man were not at all raised up to the center of being, it is inevitable that the need would arise for some mandatory regulation, for rules, that is, how a person understood from his ek-sistence, coming forth into Being, should live historically. The desire for ethics compels more insistently toward its fulfillment as man’s confusion, whether it be evident or withheld, grows to the point of immeasurability.”⁴ What does Heidegger’s statement tell us? Heidegger is proposing that we consider ethics closely in its original source, distinguishing it from morality and from “ethics” as a “philosophical discipline,” which is closer to social or political issues. Heidegger distinguishes ἔθος from ἦθος, preferring to discuss “ethos” instead of “ethics.” For Heidegger etymological archaeology is not a return to the “direct,” “primitive,” or “perceptible” meaning of the word. The erased etymological trail is one of the signs of an eroded trail of the original thinking of Being, a motif for thinking through. So why is it that “the tragedies of Sophocles . . . preserve ‘ethos’ in their poetic language with greater proximity to the source than Aristotle’s lectures on ‘ethics’”?⁵ The meaning of ἔθος—a habit, a usual practice, a custom—intersects with the original meaning of the word ἦθος—temperament, custom, character, way of thinking. But ἦθος has another meaning that Heidegger considers crucial: usual place of residence, dwelling, abode. Thus, for Heidegger “ethics” does not deal with the moral measure of a person’s Being (“morality,” from Latin “mos”: temperament, custom, lifestyle, behavior; law, rule, regulation) or with “customs and regulations.” In harmony with the basic meaning of the word ἦθος, the word “ethics” should mean that “it interprets a person’s place of residence,” and thought “that considers the source of being closely in the sense of the primordial elements of a person as an ek-sisting entity is in itself already ethics and its source. At the same time thought is not entirely ethics, because it is ontology.”⁶ Thus, for Heidegger the word “ethos” “means an open area where a person lives. The open space of his residence allows what pertains to the human being and what, absorbing him, resides in his proximity to be.”⁷ From *Being and Time* we know that the dwelling is the essence of “being-in-the-world.” *Dasein* has being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) should be understood as the kind of entity that resides alongside/in the world and is thus familiar with it. This “in” means to settle, to dwell, to reside, to trust in, to take care of something, not to be indifferent to something, to look after something. Any “theoretical” attitude toward the entity that interprets the entity as an object is based on an attitude of concerned, not indifferent care: this is the only way that an entity generally allows for approaching itself, the only way

the truth of Being can be comprehended without having to “force” Being into a concept.

Ontology understood as phenomenology proceeds from the fact that a being opens up itself, it allows for an encounter with itself, it goes out to meet. But any possibility of encountering an entity in the usual sense of the word is a determination of being of human *Dasein*. The ability to enter into a relationship with an entity, to put oneself in a defined relationship with an entity, to relate to an entity, is inherent only to a defined entity that is “always we ourselves,” or *Dasein*. From this Heidegger concludes that the fundamental discipline of ontology is an analysis of *Dasein*. Ontology has an ontic foundation. Heidegger’s consideration of an ontic basis for ontology, that is, the development of an existential analysis of *Dasein*, is largely defined by his radical revision of basic metaphysics related to a renewal of the “meaning of Being” question. For Heidegger, the main text here is Book VI of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. The main clash of Book VI is a dispute on governance between wisdom (σοφία) and judiciousness (φρόνησις), between the theoretical and the practical. Aristotle’s choice in favor of σοφία is well known, but Heidegger reinterprets Aristotle in such a way that he sees the primacy of practical reason in Aristotle, as defined in relation to the theoretical. According to Heidegger, practical reason is the authentic, true life: a true life that lacks theory, but through which theory first becomes understood.⁸ Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Aristotle is not simply critical “license”; it is an attempt to think differently: Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is an ontology of doing (πράξις) and making (ποίησις). Judiciousness (φρόνησις) becomes the fundamental means of disclosing an entity in its Being. An entity reveals itself in various ways, but primarily not as an objective “what”: our ability to deal with a thing reveals, above all other characteristics, its way of “being-in-order-to.” We have some relation to this entity; we are not indifferent to it. In action, the entity near me is significant not simply because things-objects have their semantic determinedness, but because I, as the one performing the action, am touched by the entity in my Being (painfully or joyfully); it affects me. The entity’s Being is defined not by the presence of a thing for consciousness, but by its involvement in the totality of circumstances that reveal that it is always a certain way with the thing that we are using: this entity is an “in-order-to . . .” In action, a “for-the-sake-of” precedes the objective (theoretical) “what.”

Recall that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines *Dasein* as concern,⁹ indicating it as the first and basic condition for the possibility of encountering the entity as an entity, the openness (*Offenheit*) or disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of an entity as such. Heidegger discusses

care as zeal or “for-the-sake-of,” which is twofold: on the one hand it is *Dasein* itself, and on the other, it is *Dasein*’s most authentic ability to be. The “for-the-sake-of” (*Worum-Willen*) is the definition of *Dasein*’s existence, for which, “in its Being, it is always concerned about this Being itself.” Here, Heidegger obviously uses Aristotle in indicating one of the meanings of causality: the purposeful reason, which Aristotle distinguishes in his treatise “On the Soul” as either what is intended or for whom the act is intended.¹⁰

A.G. Cherniakov¹¹ notes that the core of Heidegger’s concept of “care” (*Sorge*) consists of a zeal that is unavoidably inherent to any existence and is expressed through the turn of phrase “this concerns . . .” (*es geht um*). Furthermore, he emphasizes that “care” has an existential and ontological interpretation, but not an ontic one. At the same time we should not that care, as Heidegger indicates, is not care about oneself; it is not a special relationship to the self, since the latter is already ontologically characterized through projectedness as being-ahead-of-oneself, and here two other structural features of concern are assigned: already-being-in (primordial thrownness in the world, the fall) and being-along-with (an entity encountered in the world).

Thus, only caring entities can be affected by the question “for what?” and only such an entity can understand the answer “in order to,” to understand it in executed behavior, that is, practically. “In-order-to” relationships are based on “for-the-sake-of”: “They are understood only when *Dasein* understands something like ‘for-the-sake-of-itself.’ As an existing thing, it understands something similar, since its own Being is determined in such a way that for *Dasein* as existing in its Being, it is concerned with its ability to be. Only inasmuch as this ‘for’ the ability to be is understood can something like ‘in order to’ (the relationship of the circumstances) come to light.”¹² “For-the-sake-of” determines the existence of *Dasein*, whereby *Dasein* can allow circumstances to be such-and-such and has always allowed circumstances to be this way, that is, it disclosed the structure of intendedness to understanding.

However, care does not signify an advantage of the practical over the theoretical: “As a primal structural totality, care lies existentially and a priori ‘before’ any presence . . . Its phenomenon in no way expresses a priority of ‘practical’ behavior over theoretical . . . ‘Theory’ and ‘practice’ are essentially possibilities of being for an entity whose being needs to be defined as care.”¹³

We should note that, prior to the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger repeatedly referred to Aristotle in his lectures. Suffice to mention his lectures during the winter semester of 1921–22: *Phenomenological*

Interpretation of Aristotle;¹⁴ lectures during the 1922 summer semester,¹⁵ and the so-called *Natorp-Bericht*¹⁶ devoted to analysis of Aristotelean texts; in 1922–23 Heidegger analyzed Book VI of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, his treatise *On the Soul*, and Book VII of the *Metaphysics*; we should also include his lectures in the summer of 1924¹⁷ and winter of 1924–25¹⁸ since the latter, despite being focused on interpretation of Plato’s *Sophist* dialogue, contained “as an exception” in its preamble detailed commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Many of Heidegger’s students from this period went on to study Aristotle.¹⁹ Reference to Aristotle and interpretations of Aristotle can also be found in the lectures he delivered just before and just after the publication of *Being and Time*,²⁰ as well as those much later.²¹ Perhaps no other philosopher had as profound an influence on Heidegger as Aristotle. It obviously makes sense to talk about Aristotelean influence during his period working on *Being and Time* and about the presence of Aristotle, explicit or implicit, on nearly every page of that text.

In his articles devoted to Heidegger and collected in the third volume of his collected works, Hans-Georg Gadamer²² repeatedly noted the special significance of Greek philosophy in general and Aristotelean philosophy in particular in the formation and development of Heidegger’s own path of thought. An enormously important milestone on this path was the manuscript *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* (the so-called *Natorp-Bericht*) prepared for Paul Natorp.²³ Of course this does not mean some banal “influence” of Aristotle on Heidegger: on the contrary, Heidegger was not so much influenced by Aristotle as he helped bring Aristotle into an entirely new and unexpected interpretation that was at odds with traditional commentary. In that sense we could say that Aristotle was not only Heidegger’s “friend” and someone “like-minded,” but also his greatest adversary. Of course, from the very beginning Heidegger was challenging the primacy of the theoretical over the practical that was established and entrenched in European metaphysics. When referring to Aristotelean texts, Heidegger is challenging us to rethink the “first” part of first philosophy, neither more nor less. The leading question in interpretation of Aristotle concerns the objectness of being, in which a person’s being and life’s being are interpreted. Heidegger asks himself what the phenomenological foundation for explicating the person might be, and what categories occur within this foundation. Therefore, Aristotle’s thinking becomes a model for Heidegger, a model that provides new problems, and a paradigm for new, radical line of questioning.

In his 1922 manuscript *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*,²⁴ Heidegger offers his understanding of philosophy as hermeneutic phenomenology. Phenomenology is not a hermeneutically naïve appeal to

things themselves, as if there were a reason for a reverse withdrawal or return of some kind of lost primal position; it is the self-directedness of actual life. In fact, philosophy is life, the self-articulation of life from itself. Therefore, any philosophical research is in tune with the life situation from which and for the sake of which it makes its inquiries. It would seem that Heidegger begins his revolutionary philosophical activity in a manner traditional for the phenomenological orientation of the thinker: with a description of the world, or, to use Heidegger's own words, "the lived experience of the surrounding world," and its correlative, the "surrounding-world" (*Umwelt*). From the very beginning Heidegger's thought was focused on the problem of the *world*.²⁵ As we know, Husserl's point of departure and his paradigmatic phenomenological and descriptive work were the particularistic act of intentional consciousness aimed at an individual (sensory or categorical) object. The starting point of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology was the "lived experience of the surrounding world," "life in itself" (*Leben an sich*), and somewhat later, "facticity" (*Faktizität*).

For Heidegger, the world is not an endless chain of diverse things, but a significant wholeness that cannot be reduced either to an "inner world" or to an "external reality." The world and everything we encounter in it does not originally exist but signifies. This is the primal manner of Being of the world and of the "surrounding-world" (*Umwelt*). Before I can make anything an object for myself, "always and everywhere signifies (*bedeutet*) to me." Heidegger explains the meaning of the term "to signify" in this context, using it as a synonym for the old German verb "to world" (*welten*), meaning "to lead a full life." The world does not "be," but it is always shaped within its boundless but perceived wholeness. I discover myself in the very same "significant" and "worldly" way. At this stage, Heidegger understands philosophy as the theoretical, original science of the lifeworld. This refers to the sphere of ontologically relevant experience that cannot be localized either in "reality" or in "subjectivity." This experience is what mediates any statement and the relationship to any object. Heidegger calls this sphere of ontological "experience" both a "hermeneutic" and a "pretheoretical" dimension. The meaning of "pretheoretical" goes beyond the traditional opposition of the theoretical and the practical. The pretheoretical does not enter into what we call the prescientific. The pretheoretical is nontheoretical. It characterizes a means of access to the "dimension of being," since this dimension, as the predominant topic of phenomenological research, can never be the object of theoretical analysis. The nontheoretical, nonobjectifying nature of the "hermeneutically phenomenological"

standpoint retains its significance for Heidegger throughout his work, and in the context of his being-historical work on “the question of Being,” that is, at the last stage of his path.

Beginning in the first of his lectures, Heidegger rejects what has become the traditional focus of philosophy on “science,” despite characterizing phenomenology as “the original science.” By a rejection of the focus on contemporary science, Heidegger did not mean a rejection of the idea of scientific rigor. On the contrary, much like Husserl, albeit in his own way, Heidegger was focused on the radicalization of scientific rigor. We should understand Heidegger’s phenomenological project in this context of radicalizing scientific rigor, a radicalization that leads to the source of the scientific as such. Hermeneutic phenomenology is not a constituted description of what is already “given” us; on the contrary, it represents a form of participation in the shaping and self-discovery of primal phenomena. We should note that this kind of methodological self-understanding is also characteristic of Heidegger’s late philosophy, which again undertakes research into the question of Being.

The next important step on the path of comprehending philosophy is understanding it as a hermeneutics of facticity. The figure of Aristotle is again in the foreground here: the question Heidegger raises in reference to Aristotelean texts is that of the being of human Being. He does not hide the fact that his planned reading of Aristotle is *Daseinsanalytik*, the questioning of what kind of entity experiences and interprets Being. His goal in reading Aristotle is to disclose *Sinn von Dasein*, the various “categories” that constitute a means of Being of the kind of entity that is already always and in some relation to Being. The traditional interpretation of Heideggerian destruction as a critical movement back through the history of philosophy with the goal of overcoming it is complicated by the point that Heidegger appeals to Aristotle for help in clarifying the various means of Being that make hermeneutical phenomenology possible. In the case of Aristotle, Heidegger reveals that the actual futurity of philosophical thought was already prepared in advance but buried by the fruitless tradition of reasoning. In the context of his own reading, the problematics of facticity, Heidegger shows that Aristotle raised the question of the factual human life in its original form.²⁶ Heidegger shows that facticity is essentially the prepossession of philosophy: it is the where philosophy always finds itself, the place it should seek out and find as its own, and the what it always possesses. Thus, facticity is not something given; on the contrary, it represents a condition for the possibility of any givenness, or of any knowledge or self-knowledge. Facticity means “unmediated” experience, or a phenomenon of phenomenology, and it also implies a kind of “reserve

of intelligibility and unmediated availability”²⁷ that forms the foundation of our behavior, both theoretical and practical. If the main goal of Heidegger’s early phenomenology consisted of explicating this facticity, then beginning in the 1930s Heidegger directed most of his attention toward learning to reside alongside it “practically.” We have to thematize the sphere of the radically factual, which implies our own, nontheoretically understood life, in order to eliminate “the fundamental shortcoming of traditional and present-day ontology.” This “shortcoming” consists, first of all, in focusing all ontological problematics on “Being the object”:²⁸ the uncritical assumption of this focus points to “a fundamental need for resuming the question of Being.”²⁹ Second, earlier ontology “closes itself off to approaching the entity resolved in philosophical problematics: there-being, from which and for the sake of which philosophy ‘is.’”³⁰ Thus, *Dasein* or “factual life” is itself a “deciding entity” since only “from” it and “for” it should how to discover Being be decided. According to Heidegger, any ontological theory is based on a pretheoretical “self-interpretation of facticity.” In the text of his lectures for the summer semester of 1923, Heidegger writes, “The task of hermeneutics consists of making my own there-being always available in its nature of being to there-being itself, to alert it about itself, to investigate the self-alienation under which pressure there-being is located. Hermeneutics creates the possibility for there-being to become and to be for its own sake through understanding.”³¹

Hermeneutical and phenomenological philosophy not only corrects traditional ontology, but it also opens up new possibilities for human self-knowledge relevant to practical relationships. As knowledge, this philosophy is simultaneously a form of fulfilling a person’s Being, which only allows for discovering its connection with Being in general and thereby makes it possible to formulate the ontological problem correctly. Thus, we can say that Heidegger’s early phenomenology perceives itself in two perspectives at once: the ontological and the existential-ethical.

The definitive version of hermeneutic and ontological phenomenology occurs in *Being and Time*, and later in *Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträgen zur Philosophie)*. *Being and Time* calls all of European metaphysics into question and in that sense arrives at its own conclusion, a conclusion he still claimed in his courses and works devoted to Aristotle until 1928, but he also revealed another, nonmetaphysical perspective for philosophizing: fundamental ontology thematizes Being as such from the perspective of human being, that is, as an entity’s Being. The “first principles” of metaphysics become the for-itself-not-indifferent Being *Dasein*, which “has” meaning. If we pose the question of Being anew, and

if, as we have shown above, we use φρόνησις as the equiprimordial means of understanding (disclosing) Being, then not only does Kant's "Copernican turn" take place, but the whole person becomes "a measure of all things," and not just some part of him. If the ontological definition of *Dasein* consists of the point that its own Being is "entrusted" to it, then it has no one to entrust with the definition of good, and it has nowhere from which to borrow any standard for its own authenticity. The ontic condition of ontology that Heidegger displays here consists of the point that *Dasein* contains within itself the possibility of understanding for-the-sake-of and of disclosing the entity as a for-the-sake-of, and "understanding" here means also to desire, to strive for. The disclosure of for-the-sake-of is no less a matter of will and judiciousness (φρόνησις) than of simple understanding.

But the question of Being, as it was developed in *Being and Time*, acquires a somewhat different view during Heidegger's being-historical thinking stage. In *Contributions to Philosophy* he writes, "How and When do we belong to Being (as *Ereignis*), and do we belong in general? We must pose this question for the presence of Being that needs us."³² Heidegger begins writing the word "*Da-sein*" only with a hyphen, to emphasize the shift that has occurred in his being-historical thinking. From now on the topic of his research is not only human Being, but Being in general. "Here-" and "There-" now denote the interaction between human Being and Being in general, which is also called *Ereignis*. In *Being and Time*, "there" signifies the ultimate horizon, the horizon of intelligibility of Being, which constitutes the transcendental conditions for the possibility of all our experience, both practical and theoretical. *Ereignis* as a being-historical term for Being refers to the internal dynamic, or historicity, of Being itself, which is now understood not only as a condition for the possibility of human relationship with an entity. Now it not only the person who needs Being as a basis for his practical or theoretical activity, but being needs the person "in order to be present." Thus, in both *Being and Time* and *Contributions to Philosophy*, the person has to "turn himself" into there-being in order to be able to ask about meaning, and therefore about the truth of Being. In *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger does emphasize a different point: when we talk about the transformation into there-being, we mean not only a methodological premise, but an actual "transformation of the comprehending person."³³ An "establishment of the truth of Being" occurs simultaneously with this transformation.

In the 16th Fragment of his *Contributions*, Heidegger provides a fundamental definition of philosophy as a being-historical perspective:

“Philosophy is a joining within the entity itself: an arrangement of truth submitted to Being.”³⁴

For Heidegger, phenomenology, and philosophy along with it, manifests itself through the experience of comprehending tradition as radical self-knowledge that contains in itself more existential and practical implications than epistemological and theoretical ones.

There is a more rigorous kind of thinking than conceptual: thought that asks about the truth of Being, and that defines the person’s essential place of residence based on Being, reveals to us the person’s abode (ethos, ἦθος) before any kind of partitioning into ethics and ontology.

Notes

1. E. Levinas, *Total’nost’ i beskonechnoe* (Moscow/St. Petersburg: Universitetskaia kniga, 2000), p. 153.

2. See J. Derrida, *Geschlecht (Heidegger): Sexuelle Differenz, ontologische Differenz. Heideggers Hand (Geschlecht II)*, trans. H.-D. (Vienna: Gondek, 1988).

3. M. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften (1912–1916)*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann, (GA 1) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978).

4. M. Khaidegger [Heidegger], “Pis’mo o gumanizme,” in *Vremia i bytie. Stat’i i vystupleniia* (Moscow, 1993), p. 213. (Translated from the original German: M. Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus” (GA 9): Wegmarken (1919–1958), ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.)

5. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

8. See N. Artemenko, “Zu Martin Heideggers Interpretation von Aristoteles. Der wiederaufgefundene Natorp-Bericht von 1922,” in *Heidegger Studies*, 2012, vol. 28, pp. 123–47.

9. In Heidegger the structure of care looks as follows: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in- (a world) as a being-along-with (an entity encountered in the world) (*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in [einer Welt] als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begehrendem Seienden)*).

10. Aristotel’ [Aristotle], *O dushe* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1937), pp. 45–46. 415b.

11. See A.G. Cherniakov, *Ontologiya vremeni. Bytie i vremia v filosofii Aristotelia, Gusserlia i Khaideggera* (St. Petersburg: Vysshiaia religiozno-filosofskaia shkola, 2001).

12. M. Khaidegger, *Osnovnye problem fenomenologii*, trans. A.G. Cherniakov (St. Petersburg: Vysshiaia religiozno-filosofskaia shkola, 2001), p. 392 (M. Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA 24) [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989]).

13. M. Khaidegger, *Bytie i vremia*, trans. V.V. Bibikhin (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1997), p. 193 (M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 16th ed. [Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986]).

14. M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (GA 61) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985).

15. M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, ed. Günther Neumann (GA 62), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005.

16. M. Heidegger, "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation). Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät" (1922), Annex: M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, ed. Günther Neumann (GA 62), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005, pp. 341–419.

17. M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, ed. Mark Michalski (GA 18) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002).

18. M. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, ed. Ingeborg Schlüssler (GA 19) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992).

19. Among the best known, see Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Walter Bröcker.

20. M. Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, ed. Walter Biemel (GA 21) (Frankfurt am Main, 1976); M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, ed. Franz-Karl Blust (GA 22) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993); M. Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (GA 24) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975); M. Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (GA 29/30) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983).

21. M. Heidegger, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 13. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, ed. Heinrich Hüni (GA 33), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981; M. Heidegger, "Vom Wesen und Begriff der $\Phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$. Aristoteles, Physik B,1." In M. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (GA 9) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976).

22. H.-G. Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke* (Bd. I–X). Bd. III: *Neuere Philosophie: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, 1987).

23. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, in Heidegger M. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, hrsg. von Günther Neumann (GA 62), Frankfurt am Main, 2005, S. 341–419.

24. Ibid.

25. Recall what Heidegger considers the important meaning of the word $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$: usual place of residence, dwelling, abode.

26. In the 1922 manuscript *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* (or the so-called *Natorp-Bericht*) Heidegger explains: facticity is the fundamental means of being that constitutes human life. Heidegger called the mobility of facticity "care." Existence is the possibility of factual life; it is motion opposite the motion of the fall. Existence can be found only "by putting the factual life under inquiry," and this is the task of philosophy. Philosophical research is executing the motion of interpretation, which belongs to the factual life itself. Philosophy is also a radical line of questioning. See M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu*

Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation), in Heidegger M. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, hrsg. von Günther Neumann (GA 62), Frankfurt am Main, 2005, S. 341–419.

27. Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme*, p. 34.

28. M. Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)* (GA 63), ed. Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), p. 2.

29. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 4.

30. Heidegger, *Ontologie*, p. 3.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

32. M. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (GA 65) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), p. 44.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 45.